Can Africa’s Most Radical Democratic Rethink Happen in the Sahel If only the World Would Pay Attention?
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The recent wave of military coups, constitutional suspensions and electoral disruptions across the Sahel has reinforced the dominant narrative of democratic decline. From a neoliberal procedural perspective, the trajectories of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which have now formed the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), lend credence to the state of democratic backsliding in Africa.
Such conclusions raise a more fundamental question: what, precisely, is being measured when democracy is declared to be in retreat in the AES?
Instead of lamenting the collapse of a failed procedural democracy model, could we view the Sahel crisis as an opportunity to pioneer a transformative shift towards a better governance model? Why not see the rejection of this model as an opportunity to support the development of more inclusive, contextually grounded approaches to governance? Despite disagreements on key issues, how can external partners engage constructively with AES stakeholders to help shape emerging governance frameworks?
For decades, Africa was encouraged to equate democracy with multiparty elections, constitutional timelines and internationally certified transfers of power, often at the cost of heavy human and financial losses. However, behind this choreography, many states combined the language of democracy with practices closer to authoritarian control. Constitutions and laws were designed to entrench ruling elites; opposition participation was constrained; civic space was restricted; and executive power was consolidated. At the same time, socioeconomic exclusion and elite capture persisted and social contracts failed to translate citizens’ aspirations into meaningful improvements in their lives.
The recent coups in AES have been widely interpreted as democratic backsliding, casting the military-led authorities as inherently anti-democratic and antagonistic to any efforts for a better governance system. Coverage of the 2 April 2026 interview with President Ibrahim Traoré illustrates this tendency, with headlines framing his remarks as a total rejection of any inclusive and accountable governance model. A closer look suggests a more nuanced critique. Responding to anti-democratic provisions in the Transition Charter, he argued that the country faced more urgent priorities than elections. Contrasting the model, he believes is imposed from outside with the governance model he wants for his country, he reiterated that “this democracy they present to us is not for us.” He pointed to past practices where private party financing fueled corruption and eroded public trust. Similar sentiments, often misunderstood as anti-democratic, are voiced across AES. The target of criticism is primarily the procedural, externally validated and socially unresponsive model than the principle of the rule by the people.
While I am not in a position to judge these military leaders’ intentions beyond their public statements, popular support for these systemic ruptures suggests a broader appeal for a different model of governance. A March 2026 report by the Center for Democracy and Development found that 78.5 per cent of Malians interviewed believed the country was heading in the right direction. Clearly, for many citizens, the pre-coup order under civilian rules did not feel meaningfully democratic. That perception should prompt reflection among partners committed to democratic values rather than rigid templates, prioritising people’s will over ideology.
In this context, partners can either focus on resetting electoral timetables that risk reproducing fragile cycles that preceded the ruptures, or engage Sahelian societies, including de facto authorities, civic actors and communities, in a deeper conversation about a credible framework for a social contract. It is clear that, beyond the rhetorical promotion of a new form of governance, AES stakeholders may not have a clear roadmap to the desired governance format might look like. Consequently, more than ever, AES needs support and partners to co-design the radical changes they seek in an inclusive manner.
Contrary to common perceptions, AES authorities have expressed openness to partnerships that respect their sovereignty, an approach that actors such as China and Russia have also adopted. This suggests that traditional practices based on pressure, rigid conditionality and prescriptive transition models will not gain traction. A more pragmatic approach would be gradual and adaptive: identifying areas where partners’ values align with the transitional authorities’ priorities, building trust through cooperation and creating space over time to address more sensitive issues, such as restrictions on civic space, suppression of dissent and broader human rights concerns. However, insisting on progress across all fronts at once, or disengaging may simply exclude partners from any chance to influence the trajectory of these transitions and forfeit opportunities to shape the future of governance in AES. It is also worth recalling that many pre-coup political elites had little incentive to reform a system from which they benefited. We cannot expect such an opportunity for meaningful and radical change to emerge easily under conventional politicians’ rule, even if the transitions conclude quickly.
More than a crisis, the situation in the central Sahel represents an inflection point where the foundations of the future democracy and governance are being laid for the region and Africa. Far from a call to legitimise military rule, I am proposing a realistic solution in a context where the trajectory offers little beyond concessions and flexibility. Constructive engagement, however difficult, offers a greater prospect that emerging systems align with the values we stand for and are locally grounded, socially credible and capable of delivering the dignity, justice and participation that democracy is meant to ensure.
About the author
Adama Dembele
Adama Dembele is a program manager at a private foundation dedicated to building inclusive democracies worldwide. With over fifteen years of experience across Africa, Adama has supported civil society groups in challenging political and security environments, especially in the Sahel, where he has lived and worked. His work has centered on transitional justice, access to justice, documenting human rights abuses, observing electoral processes, preventing electoral violence, and protecting civic actors. Adama has worked closely with civil society, government officials, and international human rights organizations across Africa and beyond.
